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I. BACKGROUND CONSIDERATIONS 
Of the multitude of issues under current consideration at the 
Third United Nations Law of the Sea Conference (UNCLOS), the 
provisions on the legal regime to govern seabed mining are by far 
the most complex. 1 Not only are the seabed provisions complex in 
a technical and legal sense, but because of the issues with which 
they deal, they also raise political considerations that have tended 
to divide participating states into distinct interest groups which 
often pursue conflicting objectives. Among the seabed issues, the 
provision respecting the limitation or ceiling to be applied to the 
production of nickel from manganese nodules2 perhaps best illus-
trates the legal and technical complexity of the seabed discussions, 
as well as the extent of "politicization" of the issues which has 
enveloped UNCLOS negotiations over the years. 
The legal and technical complexity of the production ceiling 
problem will be discussed below. Its political aspects are more easily 
understood. The issue of the production ceiling formula on seabed 
* Department of External Affairs, Government of Canada. Mr. Herman was a member 
of the Canadian Law of the Sea delegation. The views expressed in this article are entirely 
the personal views of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Government 
of Canada or any agencies of the Government of Canada. The author wishes, however, to 
express his gratitude to experts in the Canadian Department of Energy, Mines & Resources 
who are largely responsible for the technical analysis which has formed the basis for much of 
this article. This article is based on a paper presented to the Law of the Sea Symposium 
sponsored by Syracuse University and the International Law Society of Syracuse University, 
Syracuse, New York, Febrary 24, 1979. 
1. The provisions on the international seabed area (i.e. "the seabed and ocean floor there 
of beyond the limits of national jurisdiction.") are found in Part XI of the Informal Composite 
Negotiating Text, 32 U.N. GAOR, Third Conference on the Law of the Sea, U.N. Doc. 
NCONF.62/WP.10, reprinted in 16 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS 1108 (1977) [hereinafter cited as 
ICNT], which remains the basic working document of UNCLOS. The central feature of Part 
XI is the establishment of an International Seabed Authority which under Article 151 is 
responsible for carrying out activities in the international seabed area, either (a) by the 
International Enterprise (the commercial arm of the Authority) or (b) by states or corpora-
tions in association with the Authority. This is the so-called "parallel system" of access to 
the seabed area, representing an important move toward consensus at the Conference be-
tween industrialized states and the developing countries. 
2. The Authority is given the duty to limit production of minerals from the Area during 
a stated period of years in accordance with a complex formula, ICNT, supra note 1, art. 
150(1)(g)(B). 
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nickel and other minerals has brought forth differing objectives of 
major mineral consumer and importer interests vis a vis producer 
and exporter interests at UNCLOS. The importer-exporter dichot-
omy has helped characterize this issue as a difference between per-
ceived interests of the highly industrialized states and those of the 
developing countries, giving the seabed negotiations a "north-
south" colouration. 
In truth, this confrontation is exaggerated. As often happens 
during international negotiations, the ideology inherent in one or 
another cause acquires a force of its own, independent of the intrin-
sic merits of the issue under discussion. This often results in partic-
ular opposing camps becoming entrenched in their ideology. Asar-
guments in support of respective positions become more sophisti-
cated, opposition grows at the expense of reasonable solution. This, 
it is submitted, has occurred in the case of production ceilings. The 
issue has acquired an ideological colouration which extends beyond 
direct questions at hand. It is hoped that dispassionate analysis, 
calm deliberation and an avoidance of rhetoric at forthcoming 
UNCLOS negotiations will help pave the way toward reasonable 
legal, technical and political solutions which will resolve this thorny 
problem. 
In reality, the production ceiling issue transcends ideological 
camps. While the tendency is to subsume this matter within the 
broad categorization of a "north-south" issue, in truth there are 
producers and exporters of minerals who have taken a position on 
this issue which may be at odds with the interests of consuming 
states and their corporations and who are not developing countries 
in the strict sense. These countries include: Canada, Greece, Aus-
tralia, the U.S.S.R. and New Caledonia, a colony of France.:~ The 
production ceiling issue then cannot be categorized as a "north-
south" question: it is multi-faceted. 
As a starting point for the consideration of the production ceil-
ing issue, it is important to survey the matter in relation to the Law 
of the Sea (LOS) negotiations as a whole, keeping in mind that 
UNCLOS is a creature of the United Nations General Assembly, 
3. In 197 4, out of a total world mine production of 734, 700 metric tons, Canada produced 
271,800 metric tons; the U.S.S.R., 120,000 metric tons; Greece, 15,100 metric tons; Australia, 
41,500 metric tons; and New Caledonia, 136,825 metric tons. Canadian Department of En-
ergy, Mines and Resources, Nickel: Mineral Policy Series, MR/157 (1976) [hereinafter cited 
as Nickel]. 
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pursuant to Resolution 2750 C (XXV) of December 17, 1970.4 By 
that Resolution, the General Assembly decided to convene a diplo-
matic conference on the Law of the Sea in 1973, 
which would deal with the establishment of an equitable interna-
tional regime-including an international machinery-for the area 
and the resources of the seabed and the ocean floor, and the subsoil 
thereof, beyond the limits of national jurisdiction, a precise defini-
tion of the area, and a broad range of related issues. 5 
Resolution 2750 C (XXV) of December 17, 1970 sets the tone for 
UNCLOS negotiations. The broad focus was to be, and remains, the 
establishment of an equitable international regime for the interna-
tional seabed area and for seabed resources. 
The creation of an equitable international regime for seabed 
mining and concern over seabed resources are at the very core of the 
UNCLOS. Going back to the beginning, the first General Assembly 
resolution in the long history of LOS-related resolutions, Resolution 
2340 (XXII) of December 18, 1967,6 established the Ad Hoc Com-
mittee on the Sea-Bed in 1967 to examine, inter alia, the practical 
means of promoting international cooperation use of seabed re-
sources. It recognized both the need to ensure that exploration and 
use of the seabed "should be conducted .... in the interest of 
maintaining international peace and security and for the benefit of 
all mankind," as well as the importance of preserving the seabed 
and subsoil from actions which might be detrimental to the common 
interests of mankind. 7 
The importance of international cooperation in the exploration 
and exploitation of the seabed resources and of economic implica-
tions of such activity for the world at large was further recognized 
4. G.A. Res. 2750 C, 25 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 28) 26, U.N.Doc. A/8028 (1970), 
reprinted in XIII DJONOVICH, UNITED NATIONS RESOLUTIONS 241 (1976). 
5. Id. at 246. 
6. G.A. Res. 2340, 22 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 16) 14, U.N.Doc N6716 (1967), reprinted 
in XI DJONOVICH, supra note 4, at 254. 
7. The establishment of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Sea-Bed by General Assembly 
Resolution 2340 (XXII) originated as a result of a request made by the Government of Malta 
to include on the agenda of the 22nd General Assembly in 1967 an item on the peaceful use 
of the seabed and ocean floor beyond the limits of national jurisdiction and the resources 
thereof. Besides the concern of the Government of Malta over national appropriation and 
militarization of the seabed, the Maltese note verbale to the United Nations Secretary-
General also referred to the need to declare the seabed "a common heritage of mankind" and 
to ensure that exploitation of the resources thereof be undertaken with the aim of safeguard-
ing the interests of mankind. Permanent Mission of Malta to the U.N. Secretary-General: 
Note Verbale, 22 GENERAL ASSEMBLY PLENARY, U.N.Doc. N6695 (1967). 
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the following year by General Assembly Resolution 2467 (XXIII) of 
December 21, 1968, 8 which converted the Ad Hoc Committee into 
the permanent Seabed Committee of the General Assembly. 11 Subse-
quent General Assembly resolutions continued to pay heed to the 
importance of ensuring that exploitation of the resources of the 
seabed was undertaken on the basis of international cooperation for 
the benefit of mankind as a whole. One particular resolution, Reso-
lution 2574 D (XXIV) of December 15, 1969, 10 even went so far as 
to declare that, pending the establishment of an international re-
gime to govern seabed exploration and exploitation, "states and 
persons, physical or juridical, are bound to refrain from all activities 
of exploitation of the resources of the area of the seabed and ocean 
floor beyond the limits of national jurisdiction." 11 This was the so-
called "moratorium resolution." It was voted against by most of the 
industrialized countries, including Canada, 12 on the ground that the 
General Assembly had no legal right to impose such moratorium. 
The apogee of General Assembly involvement in the history of 
UN CLOS, and perhaps the most important set of propositions offer-
ing guidance to the work of its predecessor bodies, as well as the 
Conference itself, came the following year with the adoption by the 
25th General Assembly, without recorded vote, of the so-called Dec-
laration of Principles Governing the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor 
and the Subsoil thereof, Beyond the Limits of National Jurisdiction, 
Resolution 2749 (XXV) of December 17, 1970.13 
Resolution 2749 (XXV) was adopted without a recorded vote by 
8. ·G.A. Res. 2467, 23 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 18) 15, U.N.Doc. A/7218 (1969), reprinted 
in. XII DJONOVICH, supra note 4, at 129. 
9. Its full title was to be Committee on the Peaceful Uses of the Seabed and Ocean Floor 
Beyond the Limits of National Jurisdiction. 
10. G.A. Res. 2574D, 24 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 30) 11, U.N.Doc. A/7630 (1970), 
reprinted in XII DJONOVICH, supra note 4, at 221. 
11. Id. at 225. 
12. Department of External Affairs: Report of the Canadian Delegation to the Twenty-
fourth Session of the General Assembly. 33 (1969). The resolution was tabled by Mexico. Its 
supporters recognized that although it could have no legal binding effect, it would prevent 
national legislation prejudiced to the solution of issues currently pending before the Seabed 
Committee. Canada opposed the Resolution, inter alia, on the grounds that the General 
Assembly had no right to impose such a moratorium. 
Together with Canada, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Byelorussia S.S.R., 
Czechoslovakia, Denmark, France, Ghana, Hungary, Iceland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, 
Malta, Mongolia, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, South Africa, 
Ukrainian S.S.R., the U.S.S.R., the United Kingdom and the United States voted against 
Resolution 2574 D (XXIV). 
13. G.A. Res. 2749, 25 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 28) 24, U.N.Doc. A/8028 (1970), reprinted 
in XIII DJONOVICH, supra note 4, at 240 [hereinafter cited as Res. 2749]. 
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108 votes to none, with 14 absentions. 14 Politically, it can be charac-
terized as a consensus document-at least insofar as it was not 
specifically disapproved of by a large number of participating states 
voting against it. Of course, this does not mean that states bind 
themselves to its contents or guide their conduct thereby. As was 
the case with the "moratorium resolution," all General Assembly 
resolutions lack legally binding force. Nothing in the United Na-
tions Charter confers such capacity on the General Assembly, nor 
was it conceived of as a normative body. It remains a recommenda-
tory body only. 15 
Nonetheless, it is important to bear in mind the various Gen-
eral Assembly resolutions pertaining to UNCLOS in order to arrive 
at a clear picture of the global context of the UN CLOS negotiations 
and the political factors which have influenced their origin and 
development. This in turn assists in understanding the whole pro-
duction ceiling issue and its interrelationship with other issues of 
world trade and development, and of the particular concerns of the 
developing countries. 
Regardless of its lack of legally binding force and effect, one of 
the paragraphs of the Declaration of Principles referred to above, is 
important as a political statement in the context of the present 
discussion. Paragraph 9 provides as follows: 
On the basis of the principles of this Declaration, an international 
regime applying to the area and its resources and including appro-
priate international machinery to give effect to its provisions shall 
be established by an international treaty of a universal character, 
generally agreed upon. The regime shall, inter alia, provide for the 
orderly and safe development and rational management of the area 
and its resources and for expanding opportunities in the use thereof 
and ensure the equitable sharing by States in the benefits derived 
therefrom, taking into particular consideration the interests and 
needs of the developing countries, whether land-locked or coastal. 11; 
The important point here is reference to "orderly and safe develop-
ment and rational management of the [international seabed] area 
and its resources. " 17 This element is of vital significance to land-
14. Id. at 242. 
15. Articles 10 and 11 of the United Nations Charter refer only to the power of the 
General Assembly to make recommendations to member states or to the Security Council. 
The Security Council on the other hand, can decide on measures to be taken by member 
states when acting within the scope of its powers under chapter VII of the Charter. 
16. Res. 2479, supra note 13. 
17. id. 
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based producers of those minerals also found on the seabed, such 
as Canada. Paragraph 9 recognizes the need to also allow expanding 
opportunities in the use of seabed resources, but in the context of 
the entire paragraph, these interests are balanced against those of 
"orderly, safe and rational development of the resources of the 
area." 18 This latter reference is of vital significance to land-based 
producers of minerals found on the seabed. 
It has been suggested that the resources of the seabed beyond 
the limits of national jurisdiction are open to all states to exploit on 
the basis of the customary law principle of freedom of the high seas, 
enshrined in the 1958 Convention on the High Seas. 1u This view 
seems questionable. While freedom of all states to navigate the high 
seas and to utilize the fisheries resources thereof has developed as 
part of customary international law based on concepts of res com-
munis-the high seas constituting common property of all na-
tions-it is difficult to extend this concept to the matter of the 
exploitation of seabed resources. The central fact in the historical 
development of the notion of freedom of the high seas in customary 
law was, and continues to be, the recognition of the rights of all 
states to navigate freely on the world's oceans. The ocean was 
viewed as the conduit for world trade. 2° Freedom of the high seas, 
therefore, as a legal doctrine, referred to freedom of unhampered use 
of the water column. Fish, found within the water column was an 
ancillary element in freedom of the high seas. The legal distinction 
then between the water column, the use of which was the central 
consideration in the development of customary law, and the seabed 
or the resources of the seabed, is essential. It may be that freedom 
of use of and access to the seabed and the resources thereof beyond 
national jurisdiction is permissible under other principles of inter-
18. id. 
19. Convention on the High Seas, done April 29, 1958, 13 U.S.T. 2312, T.l.A.S. No. 5200, 
450 U.N .T.S. 82 (effective Sept. 30, 1962). For example, H.R. 3350, 95 Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1978) 
states: "deep seabed mining is a freedom of the high seas, subject to a duty of reasonable 
regard to the interests of other states in their exercise of that and other freedoms recognized 
by general principles of international law." Of course, nothing done or declared by municipal 
legislatures can of itself alter the law of nations. 
20. GROTIUS, MARE LIBERUM 22-44 (Magoffin trans. 1916). The MARE LIBERUM was written 
to refute Portugese claims to exclusive sovereignty over areas of the high seas, enunciating 
the view which has for centuries following been part of the law of nations: that navigation of 
the seas is free for all nations. The sea being common property, it cannot be reduced to the 
possession of any single person or any nation. Fishing, as well, remains open to all. While 
certain inlets along the shore may be fenced off to make a private fishery, Grotius rejects the 
notion that on the high seas any persons or any nation could attempt to appropriate an area 
of a fishery to himself for his use exclusively. 
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national law, but such use and access, founded upon the doctrine 
of freedom of navigation of the high seas, is not supportable in 
opinio juris or in precedent. 
Moreover, there is a further distinction between acquisition of 
living, renewable resources, such as fish as a justified type of high 
seas activity, and the exploitation of a mineral resource, such as 
those in manganese nodules which, once taken, are virtually gone 
forever. Nodules are not a renewable resource, unlike fish. Finally, 
unlike fishing activities, nodule recovery presupposes some right to 
maintain a degree of de facto exclusivity with respect to a physical 
area of the seabed. 21 This notion seems to be at odds with the very 
concept of the freedom of the high seas, based as it is on the princi-
ple of res communis rather than any type of exclusivity of use or 
conduct. Thus, it is clear that the historic development of the con-
cept of freedom of the high seas did not include within its ambit 
such nonnavigational activities as seabed exploitation: the law can 
only be stretched to certain limits to embrace new issue's and prob-
lems which were nonexistent during its period of development. 
The lack of certainty over the law on this subject points to the 
need for an agreed set of international rules to regulate seabed activ-
ity and, more directly, to aid in avoiding conflicts that will inevita-
bly arise in pursuit of this activity by corporations and by states 
with competing economic objectives. In reaching agreement on 
these rules, account must be taken of the essential interests of all 
states, producers and consumers, exporters and importers, indus-
trialized and developing. LOS negotiations in this regard then be-
come ex necessitae, both a rule-making exercise as well as a political 
balancing exercise. 
21. Letter from the President of Deepsea Ventures, Inc. (a major seabed mining consor-
tium), to the U.S. Secretary of State (November 14, 1974), purporting to claim a portion of 
the seabed and its resources for the consortium, said, in part, that the company had 
"discovered and taken possession of' a deposit of seabed manganese nodules. While disclaim-
ing any "territorial claim," the letter stated that the company "asserts the exclusive rights 
to develop, evaluate and mine the deposit and to take, use and sell all of the Manganese 
nodules in, and the minerals derived, therefrom" (emphasis added.) By purporting to file the 
so-called claim, Deepsea requested the U.S. Government to recognize its "title" to the said 
deposit. Deepsea sent a similar letter. Letter from Deepsea Ventures, Inc. to Canadian Gov-
ernment (Oct. 15, 1974). Deepsea Venture was told in a reply, that the Canadian Government 
does not accept the assertion by Deepsea Ventures, Inc. that is had exclusive mining rights 
or some priority in time over that portion of the international seabed area as described in 
the notice to the Secretary of State, or that it has acquired any rights to that area or the 
resources thereof through its activities. Letter from Canadian Government to Deepsea Ven-
tures, Inc. (Dec. 6, 1974). 
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II. CANADIAN INTERESTS AND OBJECTIVES 
It is in this context that an examination of Canada's approach 
to the issue of ceilings on the production of seabed resources can be 
made. Canada is the world's largest producer and exporter of 
nickel. 22 Together with other participating states at UNCLOS, Can-
ada is cognizant of the tremendous benefits that could accrue to 
mankind from the development of a hitherto unknown source of 
mineral wealth, but Canada also appreciates the dangers which 
seabed production can pose to established commercial patterns of 
land-based production. 
It must be emphasized that Canada does not fear and never has 
feared direct, open-market competition of seabed nickel with land-
based production. At present, the Canadian nickel industry is the 
most efficient in the world and all expectations are that it will 
continue to be so. 23 What concerns Canada and other existing and 
potential land-based producers of nickel-and other minerals also 
found on the seabed-is the real possibility of non-competitive fac-
tors disrupting the open market in international trade in nickel. 24 
22. Address by Mr. J.P. Drolet, presented to the Canadian Institute of Mining and 
Metallurgy (October 19, 1978), entitled Deep Seabed Mining: A Canadian Perspective in 
relation to the Nickel Industry [hereinafter cited as Deep Seabed Mining]. In 1977, Cana-
dian nickel production was 235,362 metric tons (compared with 271,800 metric tons in 1974, 
see Nickel supra note 3), accounting for approximately 32% of world production. 
23. See Nickel supra note 3, at 1-2, 14-19. Canada's nickel comes exclusively from sul-
phide deposits. While laterite deposits, such as those currently being developed in Indonesia 
and Guatemala, occur at or near the surface and can be mined more cheaply than sulphide 
deposits, the nickeliferous minerals in laterite areas cannot be concentrated as they can in 
sulphide areas. Therefore, the whole laterite ore must be treated, resulting in high costs for 
extractive metallurgy. In 1975 dollar terms, the capital costs of new major nickel projects 
translated into costs per pound of annual nickel capacity is approaching $9.00, compared to 
$1.40 for Inco's Copper Cliff operation in Sudburg. Inco Limited, a Canadian Company, is 
the world's largest nickel producer, holding a dominance in the world market and setting 
world nickel prices. 
24. The following was part of a statement by Alfred P. Stratham, Vice President, Inco 
United States Inc., before the U.S. House of Representatives International Relations Com-
mittee, Subcommittee on International Organizations and the Subcommittee on Interna-
tional Economic Policy and Trade, on January 24, 1978: 
[T]he cost of producing nickel in these existing [Canadian] operations will be 
lower than the cost of producing nickel in the foreseeable future from sea nodules. 
Although we will not know this with certainty until we have actual experience in 
ocean mining, our first estimates and projections suggest this will be the case. Under 
such conditions, sea nodules do not present a competitive threat to the existing 
production capacity of Inco. Only if ocean mining is subsidized by nations seeking 
independent sources of metals contained in noduesl, or given some other form of 
artificial advantage over land-based production, will Inco's existing investments be 
jeopardized. 
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In view of Canada and other land-based producers of minerals, 
it is impossible to forecast with a necessary degree of assurance that 
countries presently importing large quantities of nickel will not at 
some future point take steps to promote, by non-competitive means, 
seabed production of nickel by their nationals. Given that seabed 
production will be deemed domestic production, national policies 
could easily be directed to measures aimed at promoting addi-
tional-or what is perceived as safer-sources of supply of nickel or 
other major seabed minerals-copper, cobalt and manganese-at 
the expense of traditional suppliers. Such measures which would 
make foreign access to the domestic market more difficult, could 
include direct or indirect subsidies, or tariff or non-tariff protection, 
such as quotas and other import restrictions. These measures, while 
enhancing the investment prospects of national seabed mining cor-
porations, would seriously interfere with market forces, to the preju-
dice of the export markets of land-based producers. In order to limit 
or at least reduce the possibilities of such an eventuality, Canada, 
after considerable analysis, decided to support the concept of pro-
duction limitations on seabed nickel. 
An examination of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
(GATT) 25 discloses no effective prevention or remedy against direct 
or indirect subsidization of seabed nickel by other importing states. 
The GATT provides a multilateral framework to ensure against 
undue protection being accorded domestic production and to reduce 
trade barriers affecting imports. With respect to tariffs, however, 
the GATT fails to impose any limitation of the level of imposition 
of tariffs on particular products, provided it is done on a most fa-
vored nation basis.28 Canada would be able to have recourse to the 
remedial provisions of Article XXIII of the GA TT be ca use tariffs on 
nickel and nickel products of the kind exported by Canada are 
bound under GATT with most of Canada's major trading partners. 
More importantly, even with duties on nickel universally 
bound, the real problem of non-tariff barriers or other forms of pro-
Hearings to Consider H. R. 3350, The Deep Seabed Hart Minerals Resources Act, Before the 
Subcomm. on International Organizations and the Subcomm. on International Economic 
Policy and Trade, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 67 (1978) (statement by Alfred P. Statham). 
25. General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs, done Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat.A3 
(1948),T.l.A.S. No. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 187 (effective Jan. 1, 1948). See also The Contracting 
Parties to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Basic Instruments and Selected 
Documents (1969), [hereinafter cited as Contracting Parties] reprinted in K. W. DAM, THE 
GATT: LAW AND INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION, 391-468 (1970). 
26. Id. at art. I, reprinted at 392. 
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tection continue to exist. In the case of production subsidies by a 
contracting party accorded to its national seabed mining corpora-
tions, the effect of which is to reduce imports of nickel into the 
territory of that contracting party causing serious prejudice to the 
interests of the other party, Article XVI of the GATT does little 
more than provide for a notification and consultative process aimed 
at limiting the subsidization. It does not prohibit such subsidies. 
Ultimately, Canada could take steps under GA TT Article XXIII if 
it were of the view that it was facing nullification or impairment of 
a benefit accruing under the GATT. This would involve bilateral 
consultations leading to consultations among GATT contracting 
parties which may result ultimately in authorization by the con-
tracting parties to withdraw concessions, a rare and rather extreme 
remedy, and one which may result in little satisfaction to the in-
jured state. 27 
Moreover, while imports are suppose to be accorded treatment 
no less favorable than that accorded to "like products of national 
origin," under Article III ( 4), this treatment is limited to sales taxes 
and similar measures. 28 Article III ( 4) is also qualified by Article 
III(8)(b) which sanctions the payment of subsidies exclusively to 
domestic producers. 29 Furthermore, because of the nature of the 
trade in nickel,30 countervailing duties in the event of foreign subsi-
dies would be of little use in Canada's case. As to the possibility of 
quantitative restrictions and quotas, the basic GA TT rule appears 
to impose a straight prohibition against employment of this tech-
nique, but the general rule is subject to considerable exceptions, 
27. In case of nullification or impairment of any benefit accruing under the GATI, where 
differences cannot be resolved by informal means between the parties, the matter may be 
referred to the Contracting Parties who, ultimately, may authorize a contracting party or 
parties to suspend the application to any other contracting party or parties of such conces-
sions or obligations under (the) Agreement as they determine appropriate in the circumstan-
ces. However, while the retaliatory withdrawal of a tariff concession imposes a deterrent on 
the guilty party, such a withdrawal does not necessarily accord the injured party a compara-
ble benefit since the consumers of that country have to pay more for the items on which the 
retaliation occurs. Id. at art. XXIIl, reprinted at 429-30. 
28. Contracting Parties, supra note 25 at art. III, reprinted at 396. 
29. Contracting Parties, supra note 25, at art. Ill(8)(b) reprinted at 397, reads: "The 
provisions of the Article [respecting internal taxes and other internal changes, etc. affecting 
internal sale, etc. not affording protection to domestic production] shall not prevent the 
payment of subsidies exclusively to domestic producers. . . . " 
30. Nickel supra note 3 app. at 1. In Canada's case, trade in nickel is almost entirely 
one way. Virtually all of Canadian production is exported. In 1977, out of a total of production 
of $1.2 billion, exports were valued at $975 million and imports at $115 million. 
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particularly under the guise of balance of payments justification.:11 
The new subsidies code which has been concluded in the soon-
to-be-completed multilateral trade negotiations in Geneva, 
strengthens the notification process in respect to subsidies under 
Article XVI and accords any GA TT party the right to request infor-
mation on "the nature and extent of any subsidy practice of another 
signatory. "32 Whenever a signatory has reason to believe that any 
subsidy is being granted or maintained by another signatory which 
causes injury to its domestic industry, nullification or impairment 
of GA TT benefits, or "serious prejudice to its interests," such party 
may request consultations with the other party. If a di~pute related 
to the maintenance of domestic production subsidies is not resolved 
by consultations, the aggrieved party may invoke a procedure for 
conciliation. 
Thus, there may be some comfort for land-based mineral pro-
ducing states, such as Canada, in the new GATT subsidies code, as 
it provides limited recourse for injury brought about through seabed 
mining subsidization policies by consuming states. However, it 
must be stressed that while the new code expressly prevents export 
subsidies, with respect to subsidies other than export subsidies, the 
code provides that signatories, "do not intend to restrict the right 
of signatories to use such subsidies to achieve (social and economic) 
and other important policy objectives which they consider desira-
ble. "33 Furthermore, the new code recognizes than none of the stated 
objectives with respect to non-export subsidies creates any basis for 
action to limit such subsidization as a result of serious prejudice 
under Article XVI, nor any basis for action on the grounds of nullifi-
cation or impairment of a GATT benefit under Article XXIII. This 
provides little security to states whose production and markets can 
be threatened or disrupted by seabed production subsidies. 
During the course of internal consideration and analysis by 
Canada of what was soon to emerge as one of the most difficult and 
complex problems at UNCLOS, a public proposal was made on 
behalf of the United States by former Secretary of State, Henry 
Kissinger. In a speech in New York on April 8, 1976, Mr. Kissinger 
said: 
31. Contracting Parties, supra note 25, art. XII, at 408-11. Article XII generally gives any 
contracting party the right to restrict the quantity or value of merchandise permitted to be 
imported "in order to safeguard its external financial position and its balance of payments." 
Id., art. XII, para 1. 
32. U.N.Doc MTN/NTM/W/210. 
33. Id. 
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The United States is prepared to accept a temporary limitation, for 
a period fixed in the treaty, on production of the seabed minerals 
tied to the projected growth in the world nickel market, currently 
estimated to be about 6 percent a year. This would in effect limit 
production of other minerals contained in deep seabed nodules, in-
cluding copper. After this period the seabed production should be 
governed by overall market conditions. 34 
This statement of policy appeared, on its face, to coincide broadly 
with Canadian objectives. However, realities of UN CLOS machina-
tions were soon to prove otherwise. 
Ill. PRODUCTION CONTROLS IN REVISED SINGLE NEGO-
TIATING. TEXT (MAY 6, 1976) 
As stated above, the production ceiling issue is legally and tech-
nically complex. As an aid in comprehension and analysis, it is 
useful to consider the mechanisms of each of the following proposals 
for a formula for production ceilings in terms of: (1) the starting 
point of the interim or ceiling period; (2) the termination point for 
the period; (3) the proportion of the growth segment for which 
seabed mineral production can compete; (4) the nature and effect 
of any initial "build-up" period in the formula; and (5) the means 
of calculating the projections for growth of the world nickel market, 
upon which the growth segment, and hence the formula, is based. 
The first textual reflection of a production ceiling or control 
formula was found in the Revised Single Negotiating Text (RSNTP5 
which resulted from the 4th UN CLOS session in May, 1976. This 
provision was the product of informal consultations among the num-
ber of delegations, not including the Canadian delegation or, as it 
generally conceded, many of the important land-based mineral 
producers which have a major economic interest at stake in this 
issue. In short, the RSNT formula arose out of the fluidity of corri-
dor discussions and was slipped into the text. The chairman of the 
First Committee, in his report to the Conference, fully admitted the 
need to further consider certain important aspects of this matter, 
in particular, the method used in the formula for computation of the 
cumulative growth segment as well as the projected rate of increase 
34. Address by Henry Kissinger, entitled The Law of the Sea: A Test of International 
Cooperation presented in New York City (April 8, 1976). 
35, Revised Single Negotiating Text, 31 U.N. GAOR, Third Conference on the Law of 
the Sea (4th Sess.), U.N. Doc. NConf.62/WP.8/Rev. 1/Part I (1976) [hereinafter cited as 
RSNT]. 
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for annual consumption of nickel.36 
The striking feature of the RSNT production "limitation" for-
mula was its hidden complexity. Indeed, because of the complex 
nature of this matter it was the view of many participating states 
at UNCLOS that inclusion of such a formula in the RSNT, at least 
without full and adequate discussion in the appropriate committee 
of the Conference, was inadvisable. This factor, in combination with 
a number of technical inaccuracies in the formula itself, compelled 
Canada along with a number of other important land-based mineral 
producers, to insist that this matter be discussed in full and in the 
open during future sessions of the Conference. Canada eventually 
produced its own formula, discussed below. 
The RSNT formula, which is found in Article 9, paragraph 4, 
of the RSNT, provides for the following: 
1. The International Seabed Authority is to limit total production 
of nickel in the international seabed area during an interim period 
of twenty years beginning on January 1, 1980 so as not to exceed a 
target described as "the projected cumulative growth segment" of 
the nickel market during that twenty year period; 
2. The cumulative growth segment shall be computed (in accord-
ance with paragraph 21, Annex I, Part I of the RSNT) on the basis 
of an annual rate of increase from a base amount, the base being 
the highest annual world demand level during the three year period 
immediately proceeding January 1, 1980; 
3. The rate of increase in world nickel demand projected for the 
interim period beginning January 1, 1980, shall be fixed at an "aver-
age annual rate of increase in world demand during the 
twenty year period immediately prior to the entry into force" of the 
Treaty but, most importantly, 
4. The computed rate of increase shall be at least-or no less 
than-6% per annum. 37 
It is fair to say that what concerned Canada the most about the 
proposed formula was the latter provision which computed rate of 
increase in world demand during the twenty year control period to 
be at least-or no less than-six percent per annum. While it had 
been argued that six percent represented a reasonable prediction of 
annual rates of increase of world nickel demand, Canadian and 
36. Id. at 6-7. 
37. See, Economic Implication of Sea-Bed Mineral Development in the International 
Area, 30 U.N. GAOR, Third Conference on the Law of the Sea 5, U.N. Doc. NConf.62/25 
(1975) [hereinafter cited as Economic Implications], wherein a minimum six percent per 
annum long-term growth rate is assumed, although not expressly mentioned. 
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other experts predicted a much lower average annual rate of in-
crease in the medium term.38 If these lower predictions were born 
out, the effect of the RSNT formula would be that no production 
ceilings would be operative. The Authority was bound by the provi-
sion requiring that production not exceed the projected cumulative 
growth segment during the interim period, and the projected cumu-
lative growth segment, the basis for the ceiling on nickel, could not 
be less than six percent increase per annum. Therefore, the so-
called ceiling would have no operative effect where actual nickel 
production fell below six percent in a given year. In effect, the 
RSNT formula was a floor and not a ceiling, guaranteeing seabed 
nickel production a potential per annum growth rate of six percent, 
regardless of actual world nickel production. It cast in stone Mr. 
Kissinger's apparent use of the six percent figure as a guideline. 
Events have shown recently that Canada was correct in its 
projection. Indeed, today Canada and the rest of the world are wit-
nessing annual rates of increase in world nickel demand which are 
considerably less than six percent. 39 
It is obvious that a production ceiling formula which geared the 
application of the ceiling by the Authority to an arbitrary annual 
rate of increase in world demand fixed for the duration of the in-
terim period at six percent was, in effect, an illusory formula. The 
net operational effect amounted to no production ceiling at all. 
World growth was by all reasonable accounts considerably less than 
six percent over the twenty year period during which the ceiling was 
applied, and, to return to the point made above, if national govern-
ments chose to influence open market forces as a matter of policy, 
the fact that actual demand might increase less than six percent per 
annum would be irrelevant. 
IV. THE CANADIAN PROPOSAL 
In view of this defect in the RSNT formula, Canadian experts 
derived their own informal counterproposal and it floated privately 
38. Id., app. at 2. Since 1974, world nickel production has exceeded consumption. Over-
supply has caused a build-up of producer inventories that have climbed to a record high of 
over 800 million pounds. In the past three years (1975-1978) world nickel production has 
averaged about 560,000 tons a year while demand has averaged about 13% below the supply 
level. 
39. Some sources estimate that world nickel consumption growth should average at best 
between three and four percent a year through 1985. Ontario Ministry of Natural Resources, 
Towards a Nickel Policy for the Province of Ontario, Mineral Policy Background Paper No. 
4 (Dec. 1977). 
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immediately after the RSNT became public during the latter days 
of the 4th UNCLOS session in May, 1976. They continued to do 
so during the 5th UNCLOS session in the summer of 1976. The 
Canadian proposal attempted to cure two important and elemental 
defects in the RSNT. First it tied the application of the ceiling to a 
portion of·the actual annual increase in world nickel demand over 
a given prior period, rather than utilizing an arbitrary fixed figure 
with provisions for periodic updating. Secondly, it tied the interim, 
or control period, to the actual commencement of commercial pro-
duction from the area. These two new conceptual elements are now 
enshrined in the new Canadian-U.S. proposal which was subse-
quently tabled at the 7th UNCLOS session, and which is discussed 
below. The Canadian counter-proposal reads in simple terms as 
follows: 
During each of the first five years of commercial production in the 
Area, the Authority shall not allow the increase in production of 
nickel in the Area to exceed the actual average annual increase in 
world demand for that metal during the ten year period immedi-
ately prior to commencement of commercial production in the Area. 
During each of the twenty years following the first five years of 
commercial production in the Area, the Authority shall not allow 
the increase in producton in the Area, the Authority shall not allow 
the increase in production of nickel in the Area to exceed one-half 
of the actual increase in world demand for that metal taken as the 
average annual increase in world demand during the immediately 
preceding ten year period, to be computed at five year intervals. 40 
The Canadian counter-proposal was considered acceptable to a 
large number of other land-based producers of minerals also found 
on the seabed, including non-nickel producing countries, because of 
its logic and simplicity. Many of the elements therein were ~ubse­
quently adopted by the Group of 77 in their own formulation which 
was tabled later during the 5th session." However, the Group of 77 
40. Informal Proposed by Canada, The Proposed Canadian Formulation, circulated by 
Canada during the 5th UNCLOS Session, August-September 1976. 
41. Report of Group of 77 Task Force on First Committee Matters, (Sept. 10, 1976). The 
production ceiling formula in Article 9 as drafted by the Group of 77 reads as follows: 
[t]he Authority shall, in order to regulate total production of each mineral from the 
Area, ensure that the annual production from the Area of those minerals in a single 
year shall not exceed one half of the average annual increase in world consumption 
of the mineral concerned during the preceding 10 years for which the most recent date 
on consumption are available; provided, however, that in order to regulate total 
production of minerals from nodules in the Area, the Authority shall limit the rate 
of recovery of nodules so as to ensure that annual production of nickel metal from 
the Area in a single year shall not exceed one half of the average annual increase in 
consumption of nickel during the preceding 10 years .... 
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proposal was at variance with the Canadian proposal in two re-
spects: it eliminated the five year "build-up" period of the Cana-
dian formula, and it placed a ceiling not on nickel as the key ele-
ment in nodule recovery, but rather attempted to limited produc-
tion of all minerals from seabed nodules. This latter element would 
be extremely difficult to implement on a practical basis, unless the 
International Seabed Authority was given a considerable degree of 
. jurisdiction over downstream operations taking place within na-
tional jurisdiction. 
V. NEW DEVELOPMENTS: THE ICNT FORMULA (JULY 
1977) 
At informal consultations held under the chairmanship of Nor-
wegian Law of the Sea Minister, Jens Evensen, in Geneva in Febru-
ary 1977, Canada stated its dissatisfaction with the RSNT produc-
tion ceiling formula and was joined in this regard by a number of 
other land-based producers.'2 Similar concerns were expressed by 
Canada and other delegations during the course of the Sixth UN-
CLOS session later that year.'3 Stimulated by these concerns, infor-
mal consultations and formal conference debate led to the develop-
ment of a revised production ceiling formula which was drafted by 
the chairman of Committee I at UNCLOS (the committee which 
deals with seabed issues) and included in Article 150 of the Informal 
Composite Negotiating Text" which emerged from the 6th session 
of UNCLOS. The ICNT production ceiling formula adopts a num-
ber of important concepts which had been proposed both by Canada 
and by the developing countries in their respective counter-
proposals. Most importantly, the ICNT formula sets aside the fixed 
and arbitrary rate of annual increase in world nickel demand which 
was contained in the RSNT folmula. Instead, the ICNT provides for 
the calculation of the cumulative growth segment of world nickel 
demand during the interim period on the basis of projected annual 
increases in world nickel demand calculated according to data 
based upon actual experience and adjusted periodically. To be more 
precise, the ICNT formula does the following: 
1. It provides for limitations of production from seabed sources 
during an "interim period" beginning on January 1, 1980, the same 
point in time used in the RSNT formula. However, unlike the RSNT 
42. Based on author's personal experience. 
43. Based on author's personal experience. 
44. ICNT, supra note 1. 
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and Canadian formula, the ICNT formula does not provide for ter-
mination of the interim period after twenty years. Rather it provides 
for termination of the interim period "on the day when new com-
modity arrangements or agreements covering seabed minerals ... 
in which all affected parties participate, enter into force. " 45 
2. For a seven year period beginning January 1, 1980, the ceiling 
imposed by the Authority on the production of minerals from no-
dules is not to exceed the total projected cumulative growth segment 
of world nickel demand; after first iseven years of the interim period, 
total production from the area would be set so as not to exceed 60% 
of the cumulative growth segment of world demand. 48 
3. The cumulative growth segment of the world nickel demand is 
to be projected by applying a rate of increase calculated on the basis 
of a twenty year regression prior to January 1, 1980 to a base figure. 
The base figure is to be calculated by projecting world nickel de-
mand for the year immediately preceding January 1, 1980 by apply-
ing the above-calculated rate of increase to the average world nickel 
demand during the latest five year period for which data is avail-
able. · 
4. The formula also provides for the base amount to be adjusted 
every five years, as well as for the rate of increase on which projec-
tfons of world nickel demand were to be made to be adjusted every 
five years. 
The ICNT formula was more accurate and hence more accepta-
ble in a technical sense than the RSNT formula. The net effect of 
the ICNT formula was to ensure the calculation of the growth seg-
ment of world nickel demand on the basis of known data. Both the 
id. 
45. Id. at art. 150(1)(g)(B)(i). 
46. Id. The full formula reads as follows: 
[T]he Authority shall limit in an interim period specified below, total production 
of minerals from nodules in the Area so as not to exceed for the first seven years of 
that period the projected cumulative growth segment of the world nickel demand. 
After the first seven years of the interim period total production of minerals from 
nodules in the Area shall on a yearly basis not exceed 60 percent of the cumulative 
growth segment of the world nickel demand, as projected from the beginning of the 
interim period, provided however that this shall not affect such production under the 
production limit referred to above for the first seven years of the interim period. The 
cumulative growth segment for the purpose of this Part of the present Convention 
shall be computed in accordance with subparagraph (iii) below. The interim period 
referred to above shall begin on January 1980 and shall terminate on the day when 
such new arrangements or agreements as referred to in subparagraph (A) above, in 
which all affected parties participate, enter into force. The Authority shall resume 
the power to limit the production of minerals from nodules in the Area if the said 
arrangements or agreements should lapse or become ineffective for any reason what-
soever. 
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rate of increase in world nickel demand, as well as the base amount 
from which projections were to be made, were to be based on actual 
data and adjusted every five years on the basis of the most recent 
definitive facts available. The formula had the additional advan-
tage, at least from the perspective of consuming countries, of pro-
viding for a seven year "build-up period" beginning on January 1, 
1980, during which the allowable growth of seabed production was 
equal to 100% of the projected cumulative growth segment of total 
world nickel demand. It was only after the first seven years that the 
total allowable production of seabed minerals was to be held at sixty 
percent of the growth segment. 
VI. THE CANADIAN-U.S. APPROACH 
While the ICNT formula represented significant technical im-
provements over the RSNT formula, it did contain some inherent 
defects which were appreciated both by Canada as a land-based 
producer and by a number of investing and consuming states. The 
first area of deficiency in the formula was the adjustment to the rate 
of increase every five years. The effect of five year adjustments in 
the rate of increase could be the allowance for over-projections or 
under-projections of the growth segment. This could have conse-
quent effects on seabed production allowed under the formula by 
the International Seabed Authority. The same efect would result 
from the adjustment to the base amount from which the cumulative 
growth segment was calculated by applying the aforementioned rate 
of increase. The effect of this aspect of the formula would be the 
adjustment of cumulative growth segment on the basis of "five-year 
steps." Together with certain other states, Canada attempted to 
find a method whereby the projections could be smoothed out to 
provide for an essentially continuous curve. 
Secondly, the interim or "control" period in Article 150 is to 
begin on January 1, 1980. This date is entirely arbitrary and has no 
relationship to the real prospects for the commencement of actual 
commercial seabed operations. In fact, writing in 1979, it is a virtual 
certainty that commercial recovery of minerals from the seabed will 
not begin as of that date, or indeed for many years afterward. 47 
47. In testimony on behalf of Inco Ltd. before the Subcommittee on Public Lands and 
Resources of the U.S. Senate Committee on Energy and Natural Resources and before the 
U.S. Senate Committee on Commerce, Science and Transportation on October 4, 1977, a 
company spokesman said: 
We believe that today's mining resources will be supplemented and in some cases 
replaced by resources of the sea. With respect to nickel specifically, our judgment is 
18
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Thirdly, the ICNT formula contains a "build-up" period, dur-
ing which for seven years following 1980, total production of miner-
als from nodules found in the International Seabed Area will be 
allowed to reach a level equal to the total projected cumulative 
growth segment in world nickel demand. In effect, during this seven 
year period, seabed nickel production is not to be limited to less 
than demand growth. The inclusion of the .seven year "build-up" 
period in Article 150 of the ICNT was for essentially political and 
partially commercial reasons: to meet the concerns of states whose 
companies were actively involved in the operations of seabed mining 
consortia. The theory was that a seven year period would provide a 
sufficient level of seabed nickel production to reasonably assure all 
major aspirants of seabed contracts that a sufficient number of mine 
sites would be permitted in the early years of the operation of the 
LOS treaty. Even though mineral production from the seabed would 
be held at a constant level after the first seven years until sixty 
percent of the increase of the growth segment thereafter allowed 
room for more production, early entrants would have guarantees of 
security of contractual tenure under the treaty and would therefore 
be guaranteed maintenance of their initial production levels. From 
the perspective of land-based mineral producers, however, the 
ICNT formula, by providing for a very significant amount of seabed 
mineral production in the first seven years of the interim period, 
could result in a serious disruption to established nickel markets. 48 
A more orderly phasing in of seabed production, while simultane-
ously allowing for a sufficient level of production to meet the con-
cerns of the major states whose corporations are engaged in seabed 
mining development would be preferable. 
Fourthly, the ICNT formula provides that the interim period 
will terminate only upon the coming into force of commodity agree-
ments or arrangements covering those minerals found on the 
that market forces will permit seabed production to begin on a modest scale in the 
1985 time frame and increase moderately into the twenty-first century. 
Hearing to Consider S. 2053, The Deep Seabed Resources Mining Act, before the Subcomm. 
on Public Lands and Resources and the Comm. on Energy and Natural Resources, 95th 
Cong., 1st Sess. 445 (1977) (statement by Alfred P. Statham). 
48. Nickel, supra note 3. Calculations by Canadian experts in the Department of Energy, 
Mines and Resources revealed that the seven year "build-up" would result in allowable 
seabed production of approximately 314,000 metric tons of nickel from the seabed by 1987 
under the ICNT formula, or roughly a little less than one-half of the total allowable seabed 
production by the year 2,000 under the formula. The figure of 314,000 metric tons is signifi-
cant when compared against total world nickel production in 1975-1978 which has averaged 
about 560,000 tons. 
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seabed. Failing such agreements, the interim period potentially 
could continue during the life of the LOS treaty. 
Finally, the ICNT formula contains additional technical short-
comings with respect to (a) the method by which the base amount 
is determined; (b) the method used to determine the rate of increase 
in world nickel demand, which is the rate that is applied to the 
foregoing base amount in order to give the cumulative growth seg-
ment in world nickel demand upon which the production ceiling is 
calculated; (c) the means of periodically adjusting both the base 
amount and the rate of increase in world nickel demand over the 
course of the interim period; and (d) the use of demand data, rather 
than more easily obtained consumption data in determining the 
cumulative growth segment. These latter technical deficiencies in 
the formula were analyzed by a Group of Technical Experts ap-
pointed by the First Committee at the first part of the 7th UNCLOS 
session in the spring of 1978. The Technical Experts agreed that any 
production ceiling formula should use consumption data, should use 
a fifteen rather than a twenty year regression period, should provide 
for annual revision of data, and should fit the data into an exponen-
tial growth curve. 49 
Taking into account each of the foregoing factors, the Canadian 
delegation attempted to find a solution to the production ceiling 
issue which would meet the needs of Canada and other land-based 
producing states as well as the concerns of mineral consuming and 
importing states while simultaneously resolving, the various techni-
cal shortcomings inherent in the ICNT formula. Canada entered 
into negotiations with the U.S. delegation during the course of the 
first part of the 7th UN CLOS session held in Geneva in March-May 
1978. Following considerable effort, a formula, ad referendum be-
cause of the necessity of referring the matter for governmental ap-
proval, was agreed to by the Canadian and U.S. LOS delegations 
and was jointly tabled at the Conference on May 9, 1978. The joint 
proposal is incorporated in one of the official working documents 
which emerged from the 7th UNCLOS session as a suggested com-
promise formula of the chairman of the relevent working group. 
The Canadian-U.S. proposed production ceiling formulation in 
layman's language provides as follows: 
1. For each of the first twenty years of commercial production from 
the Area, the production ceiling for the Area shall be the sum of: 
49. See, Reports of the Sub-Group of Technical Experts of Negotiating Groups on nego-
tiations at the Seventh Session. U.N. Doc. GE 78-85880 (1978). 
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(a) the increase in world nickel consumption for the five year period 
immediately prior to· the first commercial production from the Area, 
and (b) sixty percent of the increase in world nickel consumption 
thereafter through the specific year for which the ceiling is deter-
mined. 
2. The production ceiling is determined for each year by utilizing 
an annually updated projection of the trend of the growth of world 
nickel consumption, based upon the most recent fifteen year period 
for which annual world nickel consumption data are availabe. 
3. Approval of an application for a contract or plan of work allow-
ing commercial production in the Area will reserve for that contract 
or plan of work the amount of production or recoverable nickel speci-
fied. Approval therefore will be contingent upon this amount not 
causing the production ceiling. to be exceeded in the years of ex-
pected production under the contract or plan of work. Once ap-
proved, the terms of a contract or plan of work respecting the 
amount of allowable production shall not be altered without the 
mutual consent of the Authority and the other party. 
In the view of Canadian experts, this formula will meet a broad, 
two-fold objective of (a) reducing possible adverse effects of seabed 
mining upon land-based nickel producing states in the early years 
of development and (b) providing a sufficient incentive and pros-
pect for growth to seabed mining companies. In short, the 
Canadian-U.S. proposal attempts to achieve an equitable balance 
between the competing interests referred to at the outset of this 
paper. In additions, the formula corrects a number of the technical 
shortcomings of the ICNT formula, described above. The proposed 
formula does the following: 
1. Instead of pegging the start of the interim period to a fixed and 
arbitrary date as in the ICNT formula, the interim period is to begin 
five years prior to the year when actual commercial production is 
first planned to begin under a work plan approved by the Interna-
tional Seabed Authority. 
2. In lieu of the seven year "build-up" period under the ICNT 
formula, the proposed formula smooths out the effect of the build-
up by taking into account the growth in nickel consumption during 
the fi~e period preceding first commercial production and by plac-
ing the ceiling figure at a percentage (60%) of projected con-
sumption which takes into account that five year growth period. 
3. The interim period is fixed at the lesser period of either twenty 
five years (including the five year, pre-commercial production pe-
riod) or the day when international commodity agreements covering 
minerals also produced from the area come into force. 
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4. Finally, the proposed formula corrects a number of the technical 
deficiencies referred to above and pinpointed at UNCLOS by the 
Sub-Group of Technical Experts: it uses consumption rather than 
demand data, it provides for annual updates of projections for 
consumption growth and it uses fifteen year regression in determin-
ing the rate of growth in consumption projected from the year in 
which a plan of work is approved. 
It is important to add that along with the nickel production 
ceiling are additional elements to be drafted for inclusion in the 
contract-granting system, the details of which are at present spelled 
out in Annex II of the ICNT. Thus, it is envisaged that the provi-
sions of Annex II could provide for the granting of contracts and that 
subsequent plans of work, once approved, would reserve for the 
contract-holder the amount of production specified. Once approval 
is given to a plan of work, the terms of the contract respecting the 
amount of allowable production would not be altered by the Author-
ity without the mutual consent of the Authority an the contract-
holder. 
The approved plan of work will be an important commercial 
document from the seabed miner's point of view. It will provide 
additional security for further debt or equity financing for the pro-
ject that may be needed. Guarantees of permissible production at 
the stated levels also assures against the possibility of subsequent 
arbitrary interference by the Authority in the contractor's opera-
tions. 
Two important points follow. First, planned production from 
the area provided for in a plan of work must be based upon the 
ability of the applicant to realize the forecast level of production. 
Secondly, if the production ceiling on the basis of annual calcula-
tions dips below the actual permitted level of production under a 
contract already granted, no new contracts can be awarded-or 
rather no new plans of work can be approved by the Author-
ity-until the level of production proposed in the plan of work is at 
or below the production ceiling figure for the year of approval and 
any year of planned production. 
It is useful to examine the anticipated effect of the Canadian-
U .S. proposed formula. In 1976, actual global consumption of nickel 
was approximately 665,700 metric tonnes.50 Assuming an annual 
growth rate in world consumption of 4.5%, by the year 2000 the total 
50. See Nickel, supra note 3. 
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world consumption of nickel will be approximately 1,914,600 metric 
tonnes. Applying this formula on the assumption that first commer-
cial production begins in 1985, by the year 2000 the cumulative 
amount of allowable seabed nickel production will be approximately 
767, 700 metric tonnes, or 40% of total world consumption. It is 
somewhat misleading to speak in terms of the number of permissi-
ble mine sites, due in part to variations in the sizes of mining opera-
tions. Nevertheless, assuming for purposes of illustration that one 
mine site will product 37 ,800 metric tonnes of nickel, under the 
above example the Canadian-U.S. formula will allow room for 
slightly more than twenty mine site operations. When compared 
with existing land-based production levels, these twenty operations 
would each be new nickel-producing facilities of considerable size, 
surpassed by only a few giant integrated land-based operations. 
Surely this fact alone proves the success of the formula in balancing 
competing interests. 
VII. WHERE DO WE GO FROM HERE? 
Work remains on important technical matters necessary to 
make the system of contract-granting in Annex II of the ICNT com-
patible with the application production ceiling formula. Obviously, 
levels imposed by the Authority under the production ceiling for-
mula will limit the total amount of nickel that can be extracted from 
the seabed during the interim period. Absent production ceilings, of 
course, and all other things being equal, all applicants for a contract 
of exploration or exploitation theoretically could be granted con-
tracts by the Authority. With a system of production ceilings, how-
ever, all applicants for contracts of exploitation or commercial pro-
duction will not necessarily be entitled to commence production at 
the precise date as forecast in their contract application or plan of 
work. For example, if a contract has already been concluded be-
tween the Authority and a company, under paragraph 5 of Annex 
II, in which the level of production of nickel by that company in the 
year of commencement of commercial production will take up the 
total tonnage permitted under the ceiling for that year, then it fol-
lows that a subsequent applicant will not be able to have his plans 
approved for production commencing in that same year. The ques-
tion then is: what happens to such applicants? The most direct 
solution would simply be that having met all the requirements, that 
applicant would have his application approved for the earliest year 
in which there is a sufficient level of projected consumption under 
the ceiling to allow him to go into operation. There are of course 
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other approaches, such as requiring the applicant to re-submit its 
application ab initio at such later date when the consumption 
projections under the formula would seemingly allow an opening for 
planned commencement of production at levels stated in the appli-
cation. However, equity would seem to favor a solution which does 
not prejudice the interests of an applicant who, but for the produc-
tion ceiling, would have been successful in his contract bid. 
The foregoing scenario is based upon fairly straightforward fac-
tual cases. Complications exist when, under paragraph 5 of Annex 
II, competing applications are received simultaneously or during the 
same application period for contracts; that is, in the case of two or 
more applications which, if taken together, would cause the produc-
tion ceiling to be exceeded in the year for which initial production 
is forecast. There the problem is both to resolve the method of 
contract selection (for example, should the Authority have discre-
tionary powers to assess the applications?), as well as the disposi-
tion of the unsuccessful application. As to the latter issue, the au-
thor's suggestion would be to treat the unsuccessful competing ap-
plicant in the same manner as the single applicant who has failed 
to obtain a contract because of the effect of the production ceiling 
formula on his application and to approve such application pending 
the increase in projected consumption under the ceiling to a suffi-
cient level which would allow the applicant to get his planned com-
mercial production underway. 
VIII. SOME FURTHER THOUGHTS ON PROCESS 
These and other technical matters, such as the quota system 
which is insisted upon by some delegations, remain to be worked out 
at future UNCLOS sessions. Whether time and circumstances will 
permit delegates to continue these efforts is not certain. 
The various elements of the production ceiling formula and its 
attendant problems is of course only one of a number of complex, 
yet unresolved UNCLOS issues. Other matters, such as financial 
arrangements between the Authority and seabed operators, 51 the 
51. See INCT, supra note 1, at annex II, para. 7. Annex II, paragraph 7 of the ICNT sets 
out the financial obligations of the contractors to the Authority. Considerable work in refining 
paragraph 7 was accomplished during the negotiations at the first and second parts of the 
7th UNCLOS session, the results of which the Chairman of Negotiating Group 2 has at-
tempted to reflect in his Report to the First Committee. U.N. Doc. NG 2/10/Rev. 1 (1978) 
(hereinafter cited as the NG2 Report]. In essence, these so-called "financial arrangements" 
establish, optionally, a system of payments based on (a) a single system of production charge 
(royalty) or (b) a "mixed system," consisting of a deductible production charge and a pay-
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financing of the International Enterprise, 52 the operation of the 
reserved-area system,53 the composition and voting procedures of 
the Council, 54 involve issues which if. they are not equal in complex-
ity, are at least as contentious in a political and ideological sense. 
In the writer's view, two powerful forces, the inherent complex-
ity of the subject matter and the ideology which permeates discus-
sion at UNCLOS, militate inevitably against the early, successful 
conclusion of a seabed treaty along the lines of part XI of the ICNT. 
The possibility of resolving the multitude of inter-related matters 
to allow the Conference to adopt by consensus a document in treaty 
from along the lines of the ICNT is therefore highly doubtful. Some 
alternative solution is needed, lest UNCLOS end in failure. What 
is necessary is a new approach to the negotiations which will satisfy 
the diverging ideological positions of the participating states and 
which will maintain intact the work which has already been accom-
plished in the negotiations, including the production ceiling formula 
contained in the May 19, 1978 Conference Report, while allowing 
work to continue on unresolved matters. 
What is evident from the foregoing. description of the produc-
ment to the Authority of a percentage of the attributable net proceeds of the seabed mining 
operation. 
52. The Enterprise, the organ of the Authority which is given the capacity to carry out 
activities in the International Seabed Area under Article 169 of the JCNT is guaranteed 
certain funds under paragraph 10 of Annex III. In his NG2 Report, supra note 37, the Chair-
man of Negotiating Group 2 has proposed that the Enterprise shall have its borrowing for 
first mine site development guaranteed by States Parties in accordance with a scale set by 
the Assembly and based upon the scale used for the regular budget of the United Nations, 
under Article 158(2)(VI). Under this proposal, contained in paragraph 10 (bis) of Annex lll 
of the ICNT, States Parties undertake to advance as refundable paid-in capital up to one-
third of their total liability. 
53. The reserved-area system is set out in paragraph 5(j) of Annex II of the ICNT, 1>ee 
supra note 1, and provides that at the time of awarding a contract, one half of the contract 
area of equivalent commercial value to the other half shall be reserved for the conduct of 
activities by the Enterprise or in association with developing countries. Numerous aspects of 
the reserved ore system have not yet been resolved, particularly the point in time when the 
division of the contract area occurs. For obvious reasons, the industrialized countries want 
the division to take place prior to the commencement of exploration activities in order to 
avoid undue costs to the contractor. 
54. The Council is the "executive organ" of the Authority under Article 160 of the ICNT. 
As the key body in the whole decision-making structure of the Authority (it approves plans 
of work on behalf of the Authority under Article 160(2)(x)), the composition and voting of 
the Council under Article 159 are of central importance to participating states. In general, 
the developing countries oppose voting which is weighed in favor of interest groups. The 
industrialized states, on the other hand, whose corporations will make the major financial 
commitments to seabed exploration and exploitation, wish to be assured that voting mecha-
nisms on the Council reflect commercial realities and the real economic interests at stake. 
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tion ceiling issue is the enormity of detail in many of the ICNT 
seabed provisions. This detail, has been the result of bona fide at-
tempts to balance numerous ideological positions and economic 
expectations in order to ensure against the operation of a seabed 
treaty which runs directly counter to those interests. Whether it is 
possible to eliminate all potential areas of concern of both the devel-
oping and the industrialized states through carefully drawn compro-
mise provisions on the entire range of seabed operations under the 
current negotiating atmosphere at UNCLOS is another matter. 
In the author's view, assuming that the danger exists of the 
negotiations breaking down or continuing indefinitely without early 
possibilities of success, LOS negotiations and the conference negoti-
ating process would be salvaged by common agreement among con-
ference participants to approach the negotiations afresh and to pur-
sue the following broad objectives. The first objective would be to 
solidify or "freeze" in a treaty the agreed elements of the seabed 
mining system, many of which are now found within part XI of the 
ICNT. This would include, the basic institutional structure of the 
Authority and the parallel system of exploitation. It is reasonable 
to conclude that there is a wide measure of agreement on these two 
matters. Included within this "freezing" of the elements would be 
the executive body, the Council, and its decision-making proce-
dures. Of course, the question of the composition and voting proce-
dures of the Council has not yet been formally agreed to at the 
Conference, but it is submitted that some solution is not far re-
moved. Thus, the basic structure of the seabed institutions which 
would from the new LOS treaty already exists. Its conclusion, even 
if it contained a system for seabed mining that for the present was 
less than complete, would in itself represent a tremendous substan-
tive and symbolic achievement for international diplomacy and for 
the United Nations system. Its conclusion, with the basic skeletal 
structure, would have a positive effect on the political atmosphere 
within which the work will be allowed to continue. In fact, achieving 
this objective alone would help to "depoliticize" the LOS exercise 
to a great degree. 
Secondly, along with such an exercise must be the assurance 
that the final provision, which would come into force subsequently 
in order to complete the system, would not affect the balance of 
interests, most of which, it is submitted, are at present embodied 
in the ICNT. Nor should this new approach affect the long-term 
workability of the seabed provisions themselves. 
Thirdly, within the basic institutional structure, the present 
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three negotiating groups, which have been functioning under the 
aegis of the chairman of Committee I and the plenary of the Confer-
ence, would be maintained. Those would be transformed, however, 
into expert commissions which would report the Council in accord-
ance with the present framework enshrined in the ICNT. The Coun-
cil would in turn report not to the Assembly per se, but to the states' 
parties who would meet to review progress in the work of the expert 
commissions. Thus, the basic seabed treaty would come into force, 
while details of precise matters would be left to be worked out subse-
quently in, it is hoped, less political and more objective circumstan-
ces. 
Finally, in order to preserve the balance embodied in the ICNT 
and in the various compromise proposals contained in the reports 
of the negotiating group chairman made during the course of the 7th 
session, the Conference would adopt three resolutions on the follow-
ing which would complete the "freezing" process: (1) binding guide-
lines (to be included as an Annex to the Treaty) for the ongoing work 
of the three commissions within the basis institutional framework; 
(2) a declaration of principles and objectives on seabed mining; and 
(3) a review conference mechanism. These resolutions would pro-
vide that the basis for the work of the commissions would be the 
ICNT and the existing suggested compromise proposals produced 
by the negotiating group chairman. Thus, the negotiations under 
the new treaty would continue precisely where UNCLOS negotia-
tions left off. The difference would be that work would proceed 
under the treaty and would be undertaken by experts in an atmos-
phere which is less electric than at UNCLOS. 
The foregoing is a highly simplified model for a new approach 
to the seabed negotiations at UNCLOS. The overall goal of this 
proposal is to harness the very broad areas of agreement on the 
framework for the International Seabed Authority that now exist at 
the Conference and to embody those areas in treaty provisions. The 
second goal is to remove remaining detailed issues from the highly 
political atmosphere at the Conference and to allow work to con-
tinue, as at the Conference, but within a structure that is more 
conductive to dispassionate debate and reflection. 
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PANEL DISCUSSION 
MR. HULL: Thank you very much Larry. Just to clarify one 
point. I take it what you are referring to is the same short form of 
treaty Ambassador Aldrich referred to earlier this afternoon. 
MR. HERMAN: Roger, I didn't have a chance to discuss all of 
George's details with him but I think to a large extent we share the 
same view. I think it should be recognized George has made many 
very positive contributions to the Law of the Sea Conference. I think 
his ideas have merit. I do not know whether we have the same 
proposals in every respect but the objectives are certainly similar. 
DR. McKELVEY: Larry you mentioned the basis for the produc-
tion ceiling as being essentially a political one, a concession, one of 
a number made to the special interest, the special realities, that 
exist. I certainly agree that that is the basis of it, even if there are 
only 20 countries with any chance of having their exports interferred 
with by growth in seabed production where as there the rest of the 
countries in the world, 130, that are primarily consumers of those 
elements. Nevertheless it is a fact that there is that special concern 
on the part of a number of countries and the approach to production 
limitation was in recognition of that. But you said that Canada's 
initial concern was with possible national subsidy of seabed opera-
tions that would, and I think this was your exact words, interfere 
with normal market forces. I think it should be understood that in 
spite of the political realities of the situation production controls 
do have the potential of doing that very thing. And so, it would 
have to be accepted. But I think that potential is there even though 
it may not be very great. And I should indicate the growth that 
would be permitted under the present formula is substantial. 
MR. HERMAN: Vince, the only comment I would make in reply 
to what you've said is that traditionally it has been new forms of 
production in any given commodity that have had the most poten-
tial for national policies to protect it one way or another. So that in 
this case while I agree that you could look at seabed production 
ceilings as a safeguard to protect landbased production or to allow 
subsidization of land based production, historically its been the new 
forms of production where the requests for national protection have 
been directed. 
MR. LoscH: If I just might point out the industry's views on 
production control although I am hardly ever an advocate of the 
industry's position. When production controls were initially pro-
posed they were talking about a growth rate of 6%, more recently 
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the calculations have indicated the nickel market is going about 4 
1/2 %. At this rate of growth we would indicate maybe twenty sites 
by the year 2000. Under the present system being negotiated, the 
parallel system, allowing one site to go to the international com-
munity to be mined by the Enterprise and another one going to 
private contractors that would mean ten of the sites would go to the 
Enterprise and ten of those sites would go to the private industrial 
side. Now, given that there are four U.S. based consortia that have 
already proposed mining operations or are doing development work, 
that would indicate that if each one only asked for one site there 
would be six sites left for the private industry of the rest of the 
world. If U.S. industry sought two sites apiece, which is not unrea-
sonable, we would be talking that perhaps two sites would be left 
for the industry of the rest of the world between now and the year 
2000. To compound this problem, if we see a continued diminish-
ment in the growth of the nickel market to say perhaps 3%, we are 
talking about a further limitation on the total number of sites avail-
able, perhaps down to one site per American corporation of the U.S. 
based consortia. And maybe one site left over for the rest of the 
world. I think the industry is justifiably apprehensive about the 
possible effect of a production control. Furthermore we have seen 
that compromises negotiated bilaterally often do not hold up when 
they are presented to the entire conference for adoption or ratifica-
tion. The other land based producers, although not actively vocal 
at this time on this particularly ad referendum agreement, may seek 
even stricter controls. U.S. and Canada are only two countries of 
over 150. So that production control could be even more severe than 
what we are negotiating with the Canadians and that could be very 
mischievous in terms of allowing any development of the seabed. 
The problem is compounded by other factors within the text itself, 
including a Russian proposal to prevent any one country from hav-
ing a significant number of mine sites on the ocean floor. So at least 
we are seen going back to the 41/2 % growth rate which seems to be 
perhaps optimistic at this point. Under the present agreement with 
Canada or the proposed agreement with the Canadians U.S. corpo-
rations may not even be allowed one site apiece. I think that the 
Murphy and Breaux letter pointed out some of the problems of 
productions control and I just thought I would present them here. 
MR. HERMAN: I could perhaps make a couple of comments. First 
of all if we assume that one mine site produces 37 ,800 tons of nickel 
per year. That's a pretty large mine site. It compares pretty favora-
bly to land based production. In fact, Vince will probably have the 
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figures at his finger tips, 37 ,800 tons of nickel per year is pretty good 
sized operation when you compare it to existing land based opera-
tions. The second point I would make is if the nickel market in-
creases at only 3 % per pear, naturally the amount of allowable sites 
or allowable tonnage totally under the production ceiling will drop 
back. But I cannot see how that would make any significant differ-
ence because companies would not go into seabed production if they 
were looking at a bear situation in the market. If the market were 
bad it would mean that the investment opportunities would be de-
creased and so you are not looking at a situation where investment 
is good and the market is strong. Where there are limitations, you 
would be looking at a production formulation which dropped down 
the allowable level of production from the seabed in times when the 
market was bad and when the market is bad the companies are not 
going to invest anyway. The other point I would make is that if you 
did not have production ceilings and presumably anybody could get 
a contract, and a company could get a contract regardless of what 
the market would bear or regardless of the increase in consumption 
or the demand of nickel, you could have a situation which very 
quickly would lead to cartlization. For example, if three or four 
companies had contracts to produce from the seabed and the total 
production of those operations were approaching capacity, which 
would be well in excess of market demand, I can see a situation 
where those companies would get together and among themselves 
allocate production. Now I think the seabed production ceiling for-
mula to some extent solves the dangers of cartilization in the seabed 
nickel market. 
There were a couple of other points I wanted to make but I 
think I will leave it at that. 
MR. LoscH: One quick question. If we went to the simplified 
text, would Canada want a production control to be part of that 
simplified text? 
MR. HERMAN: Well, I cannot speak on behalf of Canada. I was 
expressing personal views on this point. But what I would say that 
if we have some assurance that within the ongoing work in the three 
commissions I referred to, the basis for any onging work would be 
the Canada-U.S.A. ad referendum agreement and together with the 
texts in the ICNT, we may be prepared or Canada might be pre-
pared to accept that. As I say, I cannot speak on behalf of Canada 
on this point, I am expressing my personal views. 
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